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Respondents Callie Cowling, Marie Grubbs, Marguerite 
Wilson, Robert Baird, Ed Baird, Jr., and the Adra Baird Estate 
(collectively the "Bairds") submit the following Answer to Cel-
sius Energy Company's ("Celsius") Petition for Rehearing, 
I. 
INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT 
This case of first impression was commenced in the 
early spring of 1985 when Celsius petitioned the Board of Oil, 
Gas & Mining ("Board") for a pooling order for the Ucolo Well No. 
2, requiring the payment of royalties retroactive to the date of 
the well's first production, i.e., April, 1983. This petition 
was premised upon a demand by the Bureau of Land Management 
("BLM"). The core issue in these proceedings has been the appro-
priate effective date of the pooling order. 
Since early 1985, these proceedings have been heard by 
the Board twice, by the Utah State District Court, and by the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah. Both the District and 
Supreme Courts have ruled in favor of the Bairds and have estab-
lished their entitlement to royalties that have, for seven years, 
been withheld from them.- Now, faced with this final judicial 
determination, Celsius petitions the Court for a rehearing, not 
to re-examine this Court's ruling on the merits, but rather to 
1/ These royalties have been escrowed and now amount to the 
approximate sum of four hundred thousand dollars ($400,000). 
-2-
send this case back to the Board- to start the protracted pro-
cess over again. Such action is not justified by the record, is 
not supported by the law, and would not comport with any concept 
of fairness. 
Celsius bases its petition for rehearing on two 
grounds: 
(1) that the Board must be permitted to determine if 
there are "special circumstances1' that would preclude appli-
cation of the Court's decision in this case; and 
(2) that the Board should be given the opportunity to 
determine whether BLM has waived its rights to share in the 
production from the subject well. 
Both of these questions were ripe for determination by 
the Board in 1985. These questions were either ruled upon by the 
Board, or were not timely presented to the Board. Neither of the 
stated "grounds for rehearing" is anything more than an attempt 
to obtain, after seven years, another administrative rehearing of 
this matter. A grant of the Celsius petition would be accompa-
nied by the needless but inevitable delay in the payment of roy-
alties long since due and owing. 
2/ The Board was given the opportunity, but declined, to join 




As indicated, this was a case of first impression 
before the Board. While numerous other states had addressed the 
question of retroactive pooling orders, the Utah Board had not. 
There was no Utah precedential indication as to how the Board 
should rule in this matter. 
The issue was addressed twice by the Board through 
evidentiary hearings; once pursuant to Celsius1 petition and once 
pursuant to the Bairds1 petition for rehearing. Following its 
initial ruling permitting retroactive pooling to the date of 
first production, the Board agreed to rehear the matter. Inter-
estingly, one of the bases for the Bairds' Petition for Rehearing 
was that the Board should consider "special circumstances" that 
made the Board's initial ruling unreasonable and unjust. Specif-
ically, the Bairds argued that BLM had waived its right to and 
was estopped from claiming retroactive royalties. Evidence in 
support of these claims was submitted to the Board. 
A. CELSIUS' CLAIM OF POTENTIAL "SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES" DOES NOT 
JUSTIFY OR PERMIT THE REMAND OF THIS MATTER TO THE BOARD. 
Celsius, after seven years of proceedings, requests the 
Court to remand this case to the Board for the purpose of deter-
mining if there are any "special circumstances" that would make 
- 4 -
this Court's decision unjust or unreasonable under the circum-
stances of this case. 
The phrase "special circumstances" is a term of art 
3/ . 4/ 
employed by both the Board- and this Court- that is apparently 
derived from the statutory requirement that the pooling orders of 
the Board be "just and reasonable." Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-6(5) 
(1988). This requirement was in full force and effect in 1985 
when the Board was first presented with this matter. 
As noted, this has been a case of first impression. 
The Bairds presented to the Board evidence and argument that 
"special circumstances" existed that dictated a pooling order 
that did not go back to the date of first production. Celsius 
In its initial ruling in this case the Board ruled as 
follows: 
Thus, the general rule which we stated which makes 
pooling effective as of first production should apply 
in the absence of special circumstances which would 
make pooling as of such date not just and reasonable. 
We find no such circumstance in this case. 
This Court ruled: 
With respect to wildcat or exploratory wells, how-
ever, where no preexisting field-wide spacing order has 
been entered, the rule is that a pooling order should 
be effective no earlier than the date of a spacing 
order, unless there are special circumstances which 
would make it just and equitable for an order to be 
retroactive to protect correlative rights established 
by the Act from inequitable or overreaching conduct. 
Cowling v. Board of Oil, Gas & Mining, 177 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 6, 11-12. 
- 5 -
did not, but had the opportunity to, argue the existence of "spe-
cial circumstances" that would dictate a pooling order back to 
the date of first production. Celsius elected not to present 
"special circumstances" evidence notwithstanding the fact that 
Celsius relied upon the case of Farmers Irrigation District v. 
Schumacher, 194 N.W.2d 788 (Neb. 1972).-' The Farmers case was 
cited by Celsius at all levels of these proceedings. It held 
that a pooling order retroactive to the date of first production 
was appropriate if there were facts that would equitably dictate 
such a result. 
If Celsius had "special circumstances" to be considered 
by the Board, it should, as did the Bairds, have raised them 
before the Board in 1985. Celsius cannot now seek remand to the 
Board for consideration of "special circumstances," if any, that 
it could have raised initially. This failure by Celsius to raise 
issues that were ripe in 1985 before the Board precludes Celsius 
from raising them now. See, Pro-Benefit Staffing, Inc. v. Board 
of Review of the Industrial Commission of Utah, 775 P.2d 439 
1/ In Farmers the adjacent property owners gave the owners of 
the land upon which the subject well was located notice of 
its claim to a proportionate share of production immediately 
after production commenced. The well-owners then contested 
the adjacent owner's ownership of land resulting in substan-
tial delay. Following a judicially determined right of own-
ership, and based upon the delay occasioned because of the 
title dispute, the court allowed retroactive pooling. 
- 6 -
(Utah App. 1989); Gibson v, Board of Review of the Industrial 
Conunission of Utah, 707 P.2d 675 (Utah 1985); Pease v. the Indus-
trial Commission of the State of Utah, 694 P.2d 613 (Utah 1984). 
In short, to allow Celsius to seek a rehearing ab 
initio from the Board on the question of "special circumstances" 
is not permitted by law; to do so under the guise that the Board 
might find something is unfair. 
B. A REHEARING BY THE BOARD TO DETERMINE IF BLM WAIVED ITS 
RIGHTS IS NOT JUSTIFIED. 
Celsius' second ground for its Petition for Rehearing 
is based upon an illusory argument. Celsius argues that the 
Court's decision is based upon a determination that BLM waived 
its rights to royalties, and that the Board was never presented 
with evidence on this issue. Neither contention has any basis in 
fact. 
There is nothing in this Court's opinion that would 
suggest that it is based upon a waiver by BLM. The Court's deci-
sion is based upon a construction of statutory law. The theory 
behind the Court's decision rests upon the application of a modi-
fied rule of capture, and not upon the conduct of the parties. 
The only mention of BLM conduct is in conjunction with the 
Court's discussion of whether the Bairds' conduct was in any way 
"inequitable or overreaching." In this regard the Court held: 
With respect to wildcat or exploratory wells, how-
ever, where no preexisting field-wide spacing order has 
- 7 -
been entered, the rule is that a pooling order should 
be effective no earlier than the date of a spacing 
order, unless there are special circumstances which 
would make it just and equitable for an order to be 
retroactive to protect correlative rights established 
by the Act from equitable or overreaching conduct. 
Thus, if the operator of a successful wildcat well 
wrongfully delays petitioning for a spacing order or 
wrongfully prolongs the hearing process, the Board may 
make a pooling order retroactive to the date of the 
application for a spacing order, or possibly to a prior 
time. 
Here, the Bairds cannot be charged with any kind 
of wrongful delay . . . . Furthermore, the BLM was 
aware that the Ucolo No. 2 well had been completed in a 
known geologic formation, providing it with some basis 
for surmising that the Ucolo No. 2 well might drain gas 
from under the BLM tract. Under those circumstances, 
the BLM might have taken some action, but it did not. 
In all events, the Bairds did not engage in any inequi-
table conduct or do anything to delay entry of the 
spacing order. 
Cowling v. Board of Oil, Gas & Mining, 177 Utah Adv. Rep. 6, 
11-12. 
Nevertheless, Celsius argues that there was "no evi-
dence" presented to the Board on the question of waiver. Specif-
ically, Celsius contends: 
In this case there is no evidence in the record 
that the BLM had knowledge of any existing right to 
share in production during the relevant period. There 
is certainly no evidence of any intention, on the part 
of the BLM, to waive any such right. The Court's con-
clusion that the BLM waived its right was mistaken. To 
allow the parties to present evidence on this issue, 
this case should be remanded to the Board for further 
proceedings. 
Celsius Petition for Rehearing at 8. 
- 8 -
In point of fact, the question of BLM's possible waiver 
was distinctly presented to the Board. In support of their Peti-
tion for Rehearing before the Board, the Bairds argued that BLM 
had, by its delay following knowledge of the possibility that its 
land was being drained by the Ucolo No. 2, waived its rights to 
retroactive pooling to the date of first production. The Bairds1 
Petition for Rehearing stated: 
The Bureau of Land Management ("BLM") actually 
knew before November 1, 1983 that its land was being 
drained by the Ucolo No. 2 well, yet sat back silently 
for over a year (until January 23, 1985) before notify-
ing anyone that it claimed a royalty on production from 
that well. Documents discovered in BLM files, copies 
of which are attached as Exhibits "A" through "D," show 
the BLM had actual knowledge of its pooling rights long 
prior to its demand letter of January 23, 1985 (Exhibit 
"E"). BLM, therefore, waived its right to royalties 
prior to that time and is estopped from demanding ret-
roactive royalties. 
id. at 2. 
The identified exhibits were submitted to the Board 
and, consequently, are part of the record before this Court. 
Evidence submitted on this question by either Celsius or BLM, if 
any, is similarly a part of this record. Apparently, the Board 
rejected the Bairds' waiver argument. 
On appeal to this Court, the applicable standard of 
review of the Board's decision is "on the record." Even if this 
Court's ruling had been based upon a waiver theory, which it was 
not, there is sufficient evidence in the record of a BLM waiver. 
- 9 -
Reversal for the purpose of taking additional evidence on this 
question is precluded by law. See, Pro-Benefit Staffing, Inc. v. 
Board of Review of the Industrial Commission of Utah, 775 P.2d 
439 (Utah App. 1989); Gibson v. Board of Review of the Industrial 
Commission of Utah, 707 P.2d 675 (Utah 1985); Pease v. the Indus-
trial Commission of the State of Utah, 694 P.2d 613 (Utah 1984). 
III. 
CONCLUSION 
The Bairds are the individual heirs of Adra Baird. 
They have been mired in these proceedings and deprived of their 
substantial royalties for seven years. Celsius asks this Court 
to prolong these proceedings further; possibly for an additional 
seven years. The fundamental objective of this exercise has been 
to achieve a result that is just and reasonable. It would be 
neither just nor reasonable to remand this case to the Board for 
further hearings. As herein elaborated, the record, the law and 
the equities of this case dictate a final termination of these 
proceedings. 
It is respectfully submitted that Celsius' Petition for 
Rehearing be denied. 
- 10 -
Respectfully submitted this fl&C day of March, 1992 ^ < 
Anthony iT^tfampton 
FABIAN & tLENDENIN, 
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